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does not necessarily follow. Blood relatives are always
given the preference to administer the decedent's estate
since they would have some interest in conserving the de-
cedent's assets. Certainly they would have a beneficial in-
terest in the estate to the extent that they would be en-
titled to the residue of the estate after all prior claims are
satisfied. Along these same lines it would seem that, in the
absence of blood relatives, it would be more beneficial to
allow a creditor to administer the estate than it would be
to allow a total stranger to be administrator. At least a
creditor has an interest in conserving the assets of the in-
testate debtor for the purpose of paying his own claim.2 4
So, in this respect, it cannot be said that a creditor's in-
terest in administering the estate is any more adverse than
would be that of a blood relative. As to this creditor's own
claim, issues could always be sent to a court of law should
other interested parties desire to resist it. It is only when
limitations face this creditor's claim that the Maryland pro-
cedure fails to eliminate this adverse interest problem, and
in such a case, it would be immaterial whether the adminis-
trator pressing his claim was a creditor or a blood relative.
In conclusion, it seems clear that the unavailability of
limitations to the parties resisting the administrator's claim
creates an adverse interest problem. Since, in such a situa-
tion, the Maryland procedure is not adequate to eliminate
such a conflict, and in view of the broad discretionary power
given the Orphan's Court by the Maryland statute and of
the practice in the majority of jurisdictions under similar
statutes, it would seem fair to all parties concerned that
such an administrator be removed because of the conflict of
interests and a new one appointed.
LEROY HANDWERGER
Recrimination As Bar To Divorce On Ground Of
Three-Year Voluntary Separation
Matysek v. Matysekl
In this divorce action the wife (appellee) was granted
an absolute divorce on the ground that the parties had
voluntarily lived separate and apart, without cohabitation,
24 Barton v. Tabler, 183 Md. 227, 37 A. 2d 266 (1944). See also 33 C. J. S.
938, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 41.
1 212 Md. 44, 128 A. 2d 627 (1957), cited in Hughes v. Hughes, ... Md.
132 A. 2d 119, 120 (1957).
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for a period of more than three years prior to the filing of
the bill and that the separation was beyond any reasonable
expectation of reconciliation.2 The husband (appellant) set
up recrimination, based on the wife's adultery, as a defense.
The Chancellor in the lower court ruled as a matter of law
that recrimination was not available as a defense to a suit
for divorce based on voluntary separation, and was affirmed
on appeal.
The Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge
Brune, stated that the statute authorizing the granting of
divorces in cases of voluntary separation' established a
non-culpatory ground for divorce and thus introduced a
new social policy into our law of divorce. The Legislature
by this statute manifested an intention to permit the mar-
riage relationship to be terminated in law, as well as in
fact, without regard to fault. The Court would not read
into the statute a limitation which is not there expressed
and which seemed to it inconsistent with its general
purpose.
The Court based its decision on the ground that the
granting of a divorce on a non-culpatory ground should not
be barred by the fault of either party. While this question
had not previously been decided by the Court, it cited an
opinion by the trial judge in the first Maryland case deal-
ing with the voluntary separation statute to the effect that
recrimination would not be a defense.' It also quoted a
note on that case in the MARYLAND LAw REvIEw and sev-
eral textbook writers approving this doctrine.
Prior to the enactment of the voluntary separation and
similar statutes, Maryland, together with a great majority
of states, held that recrimination was a defense to a divorce
action. The doctrine developed from the Ecclesiastical
Courts of England, which in turn followed Mosaic and
Canon law,7 and is a derivative of the "clean hands" doc-
trine of equity.8 Therefore, if both spouses were guilty of
uncondoned adultery, the Ecclesiastical Courts would not
grant relief by way of divorce to either of them.9
' MD. CODE (1951) Art. 16, Sec. 33 ("fifthly").
8 Ibid.
Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229, 198 A. 414 (1938).
'2 Md. L. Rev. 357 (1938).
eMYERBER, THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DIVORCE PRACTICE (1951) 46;
1 NELSON, DIvORCE AND ANNULMENT (2nd ed. 1945) Sec. 10.09.
Courson v. Courson, 208 Md. 171, 174. 117 A. 2d 850 (1955).
'Fisher v. Fisher, 93 Md. 298, 300, 48 A. 833 (1901).
'For an excellent history of the development of recrimination from
Roman property law to modern times, see: BEAmEB, The Doctrine of
Recrimination in Divorce Proceeing8, 10 Kan. City L. R. 213 (1942).
1957]
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This decision of the Court of Appeals limiting the doc-
trine of recrimination seems more impressive if we look at
it in the light of past decisions of the Court. The doctrine
has been so well established in Maryland that, when it
appears that the complainant is himself guilty of conduct
that would be a cause for a divorce a vinculo, it is con-
sidered not only the right but the duty of the Chancellor
to refuse a divorce, even though the defense of recrimina-
tion has not been formally set up.10
Some states, taking a less severe position, have adopted
the doctrine of "comparative rectitude". Under this doc-
trine, if both spouses are at fault in the eyes of the law, the
spouse least at fault may be given a divorce." Maryland
has never recognized this doctrine 2 although the Court
has held that a suit for divorce a vinculo matrimonii is not
barred by recrimination merely because the conduct of the
complainant was such as to entitle the defendant to a
divorce a mensa et thoro.13
Any discussion of the law of recrimination in otherjurisdictions is hampered by the fact that thirty-two states
and territories have statutory provisions on the subject. 4
Some of these statutes instruct the courts to apply recrimi-
nation in all cases. Others apply the doctrine only in cases
of adultery or other grounds and a few give the courts dis-
criminatory power to apply the doctrine.
While the decisions from other jurisdictions on this
problem are comparatively scarce, a number of cases have
held that it is not necessary that the party seeking the
divorce be wholly without fault or be the "injured and
innocent" spouse when the ground of divorce is voluntary
separation. 5 These cases are concerned with the question
of the fault of the complainant based on the acts of the par-
ties that lead to the separation, but do not decide whether
acts independent of or subsequent to the separation are
recriminatory. The majority of states have held that the
fault of the parties and their actions prior to the voluntary
separation need not be a subject of inquiry, since the
10 Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 463, 107 A. 185 (1919) ; Duckett
v. Duckett, 143 Md. 551, 559, 123 A. 55 (1923).
11 Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952) ; see also 159 A. L. R.
734, for annotations of cases on comparative rectitude.
Supra, n. 7, 177.
Appeltofft v. Appeltofft, 147 Md. 603, 128 A. 273 (1925).
1" 2 VE NIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932), Sec. 78.
Colston v. Colston, 297 Ky. 250, 179 S. W. 2d 893 (1944) ; Goudeau v.
Goudeau, 146 La. 742, 84 So. 39 (1920).
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statutes show there need be no injured party, nor an in-
juring party, in order to apply the statute. 6
The first reported case to hold that recrimination is not
applicable as an independent bar in a suit for divorce based
on a long continued separation seems to be the Arkansas
case of Young v. Young.' 7 Here, however, the Court reached
its result due to a clause in the statute providing that "the
question of who is the injured party shall be considered
only in the settlement of property rights of the parties and
the question of alimony". 8
In the instant case the Court of Appeals cited two Idaho
cases' 9 in support of its decision. In Idaho's voluntary
separation statute the divorce ". . . shall be granted on
proof of the continuous living separate and apart",2" while
under the Maryland statute2' the courts "may decree a
divorce". In the case of Joliffe v. Joliffe,2 the Idaho Court
said:
"Our statute clearly indicates divorce is available
to either party without reference to fault, and is man-
datory in terms.23 It expresses the public policy of the
State."
In a Texas case" cited by the Court of Appeals, the
Court granted a divorce to the adulterous plaintiff based on
Texas's ten-year voluntary separation statute.25  This
statute, like Maryland's, used the words, "a divorce may
be granted . . ." The Texas Court held that neither the
plaintiff's conduct causing the separation nor his subse-
quent acts precluded him from a divorce. To support its
holding the Texas Court cited an A. L. R. annotation, "Effect
of Fault of Party Under Voluntary Separation Statutes" 26
and ignored any distinction between fault leading to the
separation and fault independent of the separation.
While the instant case may be distinguished from many
of the cases holding that recrimination is not a bar under
11 Knabe v. Berman, 234 Ala. 433, 175 So. 354, 114 A. L. R. 864 (1937) ;
See 51 A. L. R. 763, 97 A. L. R. 985, 111 A. L. R. 867, and 166 A. L. R. 498,
for annotations of cases covering this subject.
17207 Ark. 36, 178 S. W. 2d 994, 152 A. L. R. 327 (1944).
ARK. STAT. ANN. (1947) Sec. 34-1202 (Seventh).
Joliffe v. Joliffe, 76 Ida. 95, 278 P. 2d 200 (1954) ; Finnegan v. Finnegan,
76 Ida. 500, 285 P. 2d 488 (1955).
2 IDAHO CODE (1948) Sec; 32-610.
21 MD. CODE: (1951) Art. 16, Sec. 33 ("fifthly"). Emphasis added.
Supra, n. 19, 203.
"Emphasis added.
1, Robertson v. Robertson, 217 S. W. 2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).




voluntary separation statutes, there seems to be one theme
running through all the decisions. It is generally expressed
or implied that the public policy of these statutes is based
on the proposition that where a husband and wife have
lived apart for a long period of time, with no intention of
resuming conjugal relations, the best interests of society
and of the parties themselves will be promoted by a dis-
solution of the marital bond. Therefore, the majority of
courts in interpreting these statutes permit the marriage
relationship to be terminated in law as well as in fact, and
disregard the question of fault.27 This decision of the Mary-
land Court of Appeals follows these liberal interpretations.
This new doctrine should also apply to the three other
non-culpatory grounds for an absolute divorce that exist
in Maryland today. Insanity is non-culpatory in its nature.
The ground of imprisonment for a felony is culpatory in
itself, but non-culpatory as far as matrimonial offenses are
concerned. It appears reasonable that the fault of the plain-
tiff should not be a bar to a divorce based on these grounds,
for the same reasoning as applied by the courts in suits
based on voluntary separation. The misconduct theory of
divorce has been abandoned for these grounds and, there-
fore, the misconduct of the plaintiff should be immaterial.
The ground of impotency seems also to be non-culpa-
tory, but, unlike voluntary separation, imprisonment and
insanity, it is not a "new" ground for divorce. Therefore,
decisions as to the application of recrimination in this area
might be influenced by any cases that applied recrimination
before the courts distinguished culpatory and non-culpa-
tory grounds for divorce. However a search of the reported
Court of Appeals cases in Maryland fails to divulge any
application of recrimination in this area, and the better
policy would seem to be that a suit based on impotency
should not be barred by the fault of the plaintiff.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet gone as far
as did the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in liberalizing the doctrine of recrimi-
nation in the case of Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuf i. 28 It seems
almost certain from dicta in the Vanderhuff case and sub-
sequent cases29 that the District of Columbia will ulti-
mately reject the doctrine of recrimination as an absolute
bar to divorce in fault as well as non-fault cases, although
no holding squarely in point has been found. The Court in
2TIbid. See also 152 A. L. R. 327, 336, 170 A. L. R. 1076, 1081.
21144 F. 2d 509 (App. D. C. 1944).
11 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 164 F. 2d 705 (App. D. C. 1947).
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the Vanderhuff case stated that Congress in adding non-
culpatory grounds for divorce showed a legislative policy
of permitting the" 'termination in law of certain marriages
which have ceased to exist in fact',"80 and thus recrimina-
tion should no longer be an.absolute, but only a discre-
tionary, bar to divorce.8 1
The Maryland Court of Appeals refused to apply this
doctrine in Courson v. Courson,82 and restated its position
in the instant case, stating that in view of the settled law
in this state it is for the Legislature, and not the courts, to
decide that recrimination is not an absolute bar in cases
where divorce is sought on a culpatory ground.
Since the Legislature has decided that it is for the best
interests of the State to grant divorces even in situations
where no fault is involved, there now seems to be littlejustification except stare decisis for a doctrine that permits
a divorce where one party is at fault, but to refuse it where
both are at fault. It is now the policy of the Legislature to
permit a divorce based on grounds that are consensual and
not culpatory, and the courts should not be bound to refuse
a divorce because of the misconduct of the plaintiff. It is
no longer necessary to have a guilty party in these actions
and the requirement of an innocent plaintiff should no
longer be of paramount importance.8 Since the Court of
Appeals is reluctant on its own initiative to limit further
the doctrine of recrimination, an amendment of the existing
statutes to forbid the courts to apply recrimination as an
automatic bar to divorce on any ground seems desirable.
ROBERT F. HOCHWARTH
0 Supra, n. 28, 510. Notice the similarity to the language of the Court of
Appeals in the instant case, 212 Md. 44, 54, 128 A. 2d 627 (1957).
Kansas, Oklahoma and Nevada by statute allow the trial court to exer-
cise its discretion in granting or denying a divorce when recrimination is
shown.
0 Courson v. Courson, 208 Md. 171, 178, 117 A. 2d 850 (1955).
8 The requirement of an innocent plaintiff was criticized long before non-
culpatory grounds for divorce became prevalent. e.g. An excerpt from the
opinion of Sir C. Creswell in Hope v. Hope, 1 Swa. and Tr. 94, 164 Eng.
Rep. 644 (1858):
"A curious doctrine this -
a singular kind of subtraction -
to subtract crime from crime, and
there remains nothing but innocence."
19571
